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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director/Intelligence

SUBJECT: Interim Protection for Intelligence Collection
Activities under the Foreign Service

REFERENCES: (A) Letter to the DD/CI from W. Park Armstrong, Jr.,
26 August 1953
(B) Memorandum to DD/I from AD/IC, 4 September 1953,



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PROBLEM

To maintain present level of overt intelligence collection abroad.

DISCUSSION

1. The framework proposed in the attachment to reference (A) gives recognition to the fact that the Department of State, under its substantially reduced budget, cannot adequately undertake the responsibilities for which the Foreign Service is responsible in the field of overt intelligence collection. The proposal clears the way for positive action by the DCI, as is suggested in reference (B).
2. In accepting the Department of State's position in what amounts to a holding operation, it should be fully recognized that, within the Foreign Service program, the overt collection of foreign intelligence for the Government is placed in a marginal position relative to other Foreign Service activities. With the general reduction in Foreign Service strength, this may be justified. However, if positive action is not taken to maintain overt intelligence collection activities at approximately the present level, a major source of foreign information for use in economic, scientific, and geographic intelligence research will be substantially curtailed.
3. Positive action as suggested in reference (B) probably would not bear fruit for several months. In adjusting to the reduced number of Foreign Service positions allotted to overt intelligence collection activities, reduction-in-force actions associated with the well-known "bumping" are said to be removing highly qualified and experienced collection officers from posts at which they have established firm contacts and at which it would be extremely difficult for new personnel to take over (Tab A). Concurrently, important missions to which overt collection officers were attached will be left without specialized personnel to undertake these activities.

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
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RECOMMENDATION

Assuming that the recommendation made in reference (B) receives positive IAC action, it is suggested that consideration be given to the advisability of requesting the Department of State, directly thereafter, to continue present personnel in present Foreign Service overt collection positions at the Department of State's expense until an NSC decision is reached.

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